WASHINGTON – Today
the President announced an Executive Order, “Blocking the Property and
Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to
Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information
Technology” (“the GHRAVITY E.O.” or the “Order”). The Order targets, among others,
persons determined to have operated, or to have directed the operation of,
information and communications technology that facilitates computer or network
disruption, monitoring or tracking that could assist in or enable human rights
abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Syria or the Government of Iran.
Pursuant to this order sanctions were imposed on the Syrian General
Intelligence Directorate (GID), the GID’s Director Ali Mamluk, Iran’s Ministry
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the Iranian Internet service
provider Datak Telecom, and the Syrian communication firm Syriatel.
The GHRAVITY E.O. sends a clear
message that the United States condemns the continuing campaigns of violence
and human rights abuses against the people of Syria and Iran by their
governments and provides a tool to hold accountable those who assist in or
enable such abuses through the use of information and communications
technology.
The following individual and
entities are listed in the Annex to the GHRAVITY E.O, and any property in the
United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which they
have an interest is blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in
transactions with them:
Ali Mamluk and the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate
Ali Mamluk, through the GID, has
overseen a communications program in Syria which was directed at opposition
groups. The program included both technological and analytical support from
Iran’s MOIS. Mamluk worked with the MOIS to provide both technology and
training to Syria, to include internet monitoring technology. Mamluk has also
requested MOIS training and assistance on social media monitoring and other
cyber tools for the GID.
The GID has been implicated in
serious human rights abuses in Syria, including arbitrary arrests, mistreatment
of detainees, and the death of detainees while in GID custody. In one example
from July 2011, GID officers arrested and beat surrendered oppositionists after
a firefight at a school in Bukamal, Syria. The bodies of the prisoners were
later disposed of, some of which had bullet wounds and appeared to have been
mutilated with holes drilled into their arms, legs and shoulders.
The GID and Mamluk were originally
listed in the annex to Executive Order 13572 of April 29, 2011, “Blocking
Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria”
(“E.O. 13572”).
Syriatel
The Syrian government has directed
Syriatel to sever network connectivity in areas where attacks were planned and
it also records cell phone conversations on behalf of the Syrian government.
Syriatel controls approximately 55% of Syria’s cellular phone market.
Syriatel was previously designated
in August 2011 under E.O. 13572.
Iran’s Ministry of
Intelligence and Security
The MOIS has sought to identify
members of opposition groups and monitor their activities by obtaining their
passwords. MOIS agents have been responsible for the beatings, sexual abuse,
prolonged interrogations, and coerced confessions of prisoners following the
June 2009 elections in Iran.
MOIS was previously designated in
February 2012 under E.O. 13572, E.O. 13553, “Blocking Property of Certain
Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran”,
and E.O. 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons
Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism.”
Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
The
IRGC’s Guard Cyber Defense Command (GCDC) includes a special department called
the Center for Inspecting Organized Crimes (CIOC). The CIOC focuses on ensuring
the regime’s vision of cyber security. The CIOC’s official website is called
Gerdab (www.gerdab.ir),
which is a Farsi word meaning whirlpool. The IRGC’s CIOC has openly admitted
that it would forcefully suppress anyone seeking to carry out “cultural
operations” against the Islamic Republic via the Internet and that it monitors
Persian-language sites for what it deems to be aberrations.
The
CIOC has taken an active role in identifying and arresting protesters involved
in the 2009 post-election unrest, particularly those individuals active in
cyber space.
The
IRGC’s CIOC uses extensive methods to identify Internet users, including
through an identification of their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. The
Iranian regime has identified and arrested many bloggers and activists through
the use of advanced monitoring systems, and the CIOC inspects forwarded emails
to identify those critical of the regime. The IRGC's cyber police focus on
filtering websites in Iran, monitoring the email and online activity of
individuals on a watch list, and observing the content of Internet traffic and
information posted on web blogs. Individuals on the watch list included known
political opponents and reformists, among others.
Individuals
arrested by the IRGC have been subjected to severe mental and physical abuse in
a ward of Evin Prison controlled by the IRGC.
The
Department of the Treasury previously designated the IRGC in June 2011 under
E.O. 13553 and in October 2007 under E.O. 13382 “Blocking Property of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters.”
Iran’s Law Enforcement
Forces
Following the 2009 postelection protests, during which
opposition activists used the Internet and social media to document police
crackdowns, the Iranian regime identified and arrested many bloggers and
activists through the use of advanced monitoring systems. In January 2012, the
LEF issued new regulations requiring owners of Internet cafes to install closed
circuit television cameras and to register the identity and contact details of
users before allowing them to use their computers. Given the LEF’s history of serious
human rights abuses, its efforts to monitor the Iranian public can reasonably
be assumed to assist in or enable human rights abuses by or on behalf of the
Government of Iran.
The Department of the Treasury has previously designated the
LEF in June 2011 under E.O. 13572 and 13553.
Datak Telecom
The Iranian Internet service
provider Datak Telecom (“Datak”) has collaborated with the Government of Iran
to provide information on individuals trying to circumvent the government’s
blocks on Internet content, allowing for their monitoring, tracking, and
targeting by the Government of Iran. Datak regularly collaborated with the
Government of Iran on testing surveillance techniques.
Over the last two years, Datak
facilitated ongoing technical surveillance on Iran-based users of a popular
commercial email service, designed to monitor and track the activities of its
users. Datak undertook plans to carry out this type of attack on a larger
scale, to potentially include surveillance of millions of Iranian users.
Moreover, Datak has demonstrated
the intent and specific planning to purchase intercept equipment for Internet
and voice communications.
Identifying Information
Individual: Ali Mamluk
DOB 1947
POB Amara, Damascus, Syria
Major General
Director, Syrian General
Intelligence Directorate
Entity: Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate
AKA: IDERAT AL-AMN AL-'AMM
Entity: Syriatel
A.K.A. Syriatel Mobile
A.K.A. Syriatel Mobile Telecom
A.K.A. Syriatel Mobile Telecom SA
Address: Doctors Syndicate
Building, Al Jalaa Street, Abu Roumaneh Area, PO Box 2900, Damascus, Syria
Entity: Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security
AKA: MOIS
AKA: VEZARAT-E ETTELA'AT VA
AMNIAT-E KESHVAR
AKA: VEVAK
Address: Headquarters located in
Tehran, Iran; bounded roughly by Sanati Street on the west, 30th Street on the
south, and Iraqi Street on the east.
Address: Ministry of Intelligence,
Second Negarestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran.
Entity: Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps
AKA: AGIR
AKA: Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps
AKA: IRG
AKA: IRGC
AKA: Islamic Guard Corps
AKA: PASDARAN
AKA: PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI
AKA: PASDARAN-E INQILAB
AKA: Revolutionary Guard
AKA: Revolutionary Guards
AKA: SEPAH
AKA: SEPAH PASDARAN
AKA: SEPAH-E PASDARAN-E ENQELAB-E
ESLAMI
AKA: The Army of the Guardians of
the Islamic Revolution
AKA: Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Address: Tehran, Iran
Entity: Law Enforcement Forces of
the Islamic Republic of Iran
AKA: Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces
AKA: NAJA
AKA: Niruyih Intizamiyeh Jumhuriyih
Iran
AKA: Iranian Police
Entity: Datak Telecom
Address: No. 14, Enbe E Yamin
Street, North Sohrevardi Ave., Tehran, Iran
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