The Disaster Recovery Program Has Improved, but It Should Be
Reported As a Material Weakness Due to Limited Resources and Control Weaknesses
March 2005
Reference Number:
2005-20-024
This report has cleared the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and
information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted
from this document.
March
1, 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
CHIEF,
FROM: Pamela J. Gardiner /s/ Pamela J. Gardiner
Deputy Inspector General for
Audit
SUBJECT: Final Audit Report - The
Disaster Recovery Program Has Improved, but It Should Be Reported As a Material
Weakness Due to Limited Resources and Control Weaknesses (Audit # 200420031)
This
report presents the results of our review of the Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) disaster recovery program. The
objective of this review was to provide an overall assessment of the IRS’
disaster recovery program.
In summary, the IRS
Commissioner stated, in the IRS Strategic
Plan 2005 – 2009, “. . . providing excellent service to taxpayers and
enforcing
However,
significant disaster recovery program weaknesses continue to be
unresolved. Our analysis of 11 prior
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) audit reports
identified recurring disaster recovery program weaknesses, including modernization systems being placed in production without a
disaster recovery capability, insufficient disaster recovery capacity, roles
and responsibilities not being assigned and employees not being trained, and
annual tests not being conducted or not being effective (see Appendix IV
for a list of the 11 reports). We also determined 27 of 44 corrective
actions for prior recommendations had not been completed.
Shrinking budgets have
limited management’s efforts to correct disaster recovery problems. The IRS Information Systems and Business Systems
Modernization (BSM) budgets have decreased from 7,466 Full-Time Equivalents
(FTE) and $1.971 billion in FY 2003 to 7,385 FTEs (1.1 percent reduction) and
$1.958 billion (0.7 percent reduction, including a 24.4 percent reduction in
the BSM budget) in FY 2005.
Since October
2001, MITS organization management has worked to provide resources to improve
disaster recovery capabilities, with limited results. After the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the Congress approved $13.5 million for the Master File disaster recovery
capability. However, requests for $74.1
million to fund disaster recovery needs were turned down. For FY
2005, Enterprise Operations office management requested $16.7 million for
The
Modernization Disaster Recovery Project has not developed and implemented a
midrange computer system disaster recovery infrastructure although the
Modernized e-File system is in production and additional midrange computer
systems, such as the Integrated Financial System and Custodial Accounting
Project, are scheduled to enter production in FY 2005.
Finally, MITS organization
management advised us personnel trained and responsible for disaster recovery
support duties were reassigned to the MA organization in the October 2003 MA
organization realignment, but the MITS organization is still responsible for
the duties. Senior MITS and MA
organization managers are working on this issue but, as of August 2004, had not
resolved how best to transfer the personnel resources or work.
In addition, insufficient
management oversight has hampered the identification and resolution of program
weaknesses. MA organization management
advised us the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requirements
are the focus of their security program oversight efforts. However, the TIGTA’s FY 2004 FISMA report to
the Department of the Treasury stated the IRS Plans of Action and Milestones
(POA&M) do not contain details sufficient to permit oversight and tracking
of security weaknesses. As a result, the
current POA&M system weaknesses could not be analyzed for recurring issues
that might indicate systemic problems that should be elevated to the program weakness
level. Insufficient resources and management
oversight increase the risk that the critical systems supporting the IRS
Commissioner’s service and enforcement priorities cannot be timely recovered if
a disaster occurs.
To ensure service and
enforcement priorities can be met, we recommended the Chief Information Officer
(CIO) report a disaster recovery program material
weakness to the Department of the Treasury and include new and currently
underway improvement activities in the corrective action plan. The CIO should also work with the
Chief, MA, to implement
FISMA POA&M procedures to analyze system weaknesses for systemic problems
and elevate them as program-level weaknesses.
Management’s
Response: IRS management agreed with our recommendations and will declare the
disaster recovery program a material weakness.
IRS management responded the IRS could recover all vital data
for the most mission critical information technology systems, including the Master
File and the Customer Account Data Engine
(CADE). They are committed to increasing disaster
recovery capabilities based on available funding and an evaluation of cost and
risk factors. The MA organization is responsible for coordinating
the development of an IRS-wide business resumption strategy. The MITS organization has identified its
current disaster recovery and business resumption strategies, including both
data recovery point and recovery time objectives, for all major systems. The crucial business processes were identified
and prioritized and will be mapped to the specific computing system major
applications and general supporting systems, and a gap analysis will be
conducted to identify inadequate disaster recovery capabilities. IRS management will also coordinate with the Department
of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget to request the
necessary funding. In addition, IRS senior
leadership established an executive working group to implement FISMA POA&M
procedures. Management’s complete
response to the draft report is included as Appendix V.
Copies of this report are also being sent to the IRS
managers affected by the report recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you
have questions or Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit
(Information Systems Programs), at (202) 622-8510.
Significant Disaster Recovery Program Weaknesses Continue to Be Unresolved
Appendix
I – Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix
II – Major Contributors to This Report
Appendix
III – Report Distribution List
Appendix
IV – Previously Issued Audit Reports Reviewed
Appendix V –
Management’s Response to the Draft Report
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Commissioner stated, in
the IRS Strategic Plan 2005 – 2009,
“. . . providing excellent service to taxpayers and enforcing
Disaster recovery is an organization’s ability to respond to an interruption in services by implementing a plan to restore critical business functions. Disaster recovery is a subset of interrelated business continuity disciplines including business resumption, occupant emergency planning, and incident management. A disaster recovery plan defines the resources, actions, tasks, and data required to restore information systems in the event of a business interruption. The plan is designed to assist in restoring the business process within the stated disaster recovery goals, thereby minimizing the effects of a major disruption.
The Modernization and Information Technology Services (MITS) and Mission Assurance (MA) organizations have disaster recovery responsibilities. The MITS organization is responsible for developing and maintaining disaster recovery plans to support information system contingency and recovery operations. The MA organization is responsible for establishing policies and procedures, providing guidance, and overseeing the implementation of the policies and procedures.
During Fiscal Years (FY) 2002
through 2004, we reviewed several IRS disaster recovery strategies and other
disaster recovery related topics.
Appendix IV lists the 11 prior audit reports reviewed for this review’s
overall assessment.
This review was performed in the offices of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief, MA, at the IRS National Headquarters in New Carrollton, Maryland, during the period June through November 2004. The audit was conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. Detailed information on our audit objective, scope, and methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to the report are listed in Appendix II.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources,
requires Federal Government agencies to provide for continuity of support and
contingency planning for their general support systems and major
applications. The Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM) states senior
management responsibilities, shared among business units, require coordination,
such as allocation of resources and training to implement business continuity
plans, acquisition of alternate workspace, and development of priorities for
restoring work. In particular, the
Associate CIO, Information Technology Services, is responsible for ensuring
information system resources are adequately protected and consistent with
security policies, standards, and procedures and for ensuring contingency
planning capabilities (e.g., disaster recovery). The Chief, MA, is responsible for ensuring all applicable security policies, procedures,
and control techniques are implemented for systems and processing facilities;
evaluating and overseeing all major information security programs; and managing
core security operations, including existing disaster recovery capabilities.
During FYs 2002 through 2004, IRS management initiated and/or completed several actions that demonstrated the increased emphasis on emergency management and preparedness. For example:
o MA organization management coordinated with the various IRS organizations managing the business continuity and disaster recovery planning area to define the roles, responsibilities, and expectations for each area (see Appendix IV, Audit Report number 1).
o
MITS organization management assigned the
responsibilities for preparing and testing
o Detroit Computing Center management corrected midrange computer disaster recovery data and documentation backup and offsite storage problems (see Appendix IV, Audit Report number 3).
o MITS organization personnel conducted annual Computing Center mainframe computer system disaster recovery plan tests in 2004, including integrated testing of selected interdependent mainframe computer disaster recovery plans (see Appendix IV, Audit Report numbers 6 and 9).
While senior management has committed the IRS to emergency management and preparedness, additional resources and improved management oversight are needed to ensure the information systems that support the IRS Commissioner’s service and enforcement priorities can be recovered timely if a disaster occurs.
The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
requires each Federal Government agency to develop, document, and implement an
agency-wide information security program that includes plans and procedures to
ensure continuity of operation for information systems that support agency
operations and assets. Department of the Treasury Publication 85-01 (TD
P 85-01), Treasury Information Technology Security Program, states
bureaus shall develop and maintain detailed disaster recovery plans and
the associated recovery capability in the event normal operations are
disrupted. The IRM requires IRS
management to allocate the resources
required to support the recovery of critical processes and applications,
including computer hardware and software.
In addition, the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act
of 1982 (FMFIA) requires each Federal Government agency to conduct annual evaluations of its systems of
internal accounting and administrative control.
Each agency is also required to prepare an annual report for the Congress and the President that identifies material
weaknesses and the agency’s corrective action plans and schedules.
Analysis of prior TIGTA audit reports identified recurring disaster recovery program weaknesses
We analyzed 11 prior audit reports to identify
recurring disaster recovery program weaknesses and concluded IRS management has
not effectively addressed the program weaknesses. Details about the audit reports analysis are included in Table 1
(see Appendix IV for a list of the 11 audit reports).
Table 1:
Reported Disaster Recovery Program Weaknesses
|
Reported Issues ********* Audit
Reports |
Modernization systems being placed in production
without a disaster recovery capability |
Disaster recovery capability not
sufficient or cost effectiveness not assured |
Data
not protected or easily retrievable |
Disaster recovery roles and
responsibilities not assigned and employees not trained |
Disaster recovery plans not complete and
accurate |
Annual disaster recovery tests not
conducted or not effective |
|
1.
The Business
Continuity Program |
|
|
|
X |
|
|
|
2.
Protecting Critical
Assets |
|
|
X |
X |
|
|
|
3.
The
Consolidated Midrange Computer Systems |
|
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
4.
Software
Products to Manage and Control Computer Resources |
|
|
|
X |
|
X |
|
5.
The Integrated Financial
System |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.
The Master
File |
|
|
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
7.
The Custodial Accounting
Project |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
8.
Data
Communications |
|
X |
|
X |
X |
X |
|
9.
The Mainframe
Computer Systems |
|
X |
X |
X |
X |
X |
|
10. The Integrated Financial
System |
|
|
|
|
|
X |
|
11.
The Customer Account Data
Engine |
X |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number
of Reports |
3 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
4 |
6 |
Source:
TIGTA audit reports.
We also analyzed the status of IRS management’s corrective
actions on the recommendations included in the 11 audit reports. Details about the corrective action status
analysis are included in Table 2.
Table 2:
Status of Management’s Corrective Actions
|
Status (as of September 4,
2004) ********* Audit
Reports |
Number
of Corrective Actions |
Open and Original Date Not Due |
Open With Extended Due Date |
Closed by Original Due Date |
Closed With Extended Due Date |
|
1.
The Business
Continuity Program |
4 |
|
|
4 |
|
|
2.
Protecting Critical
Assets |
2 |
1 |
|
1 |
|
|
3.
The
Consolidated Midrange Computer Systems |
9 |
|
2 |
3 |
4 |
|
4.
Software
Products to Manage and Control Computer Resources |
1 |
|
|
1 |
|
|
5.
The Integrated Financial
System |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
6.
The Master
File |
7 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
7.
The Custodial Accounting
Project |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
8.
Data
Communications |
8 |
5 |
|
3 |
|
|
9.
The Mainframe
Computer Systems |
11 |
11 |
|
|
|
|
10. The Integrated Financial
System |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
11.
The Customer Account Data
Engine |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Number
of Corrective Actions |
44 |
24 |
3 |
13 |
4 |
Source:
TIGTA audit reports and Department of the Treasury Joint Audit
Management
The scheduled completion dates for 27 open corrective actions ranged from September 2004 to January 2007. Management had not responded to a draft report (Audit Report number 11) or provided completion dates for corrective actions to two recommendations as of the date of our analysis. Therefore, the corrective actions will not immediately alleviate the disaster recovery risks.
Shrinking budgets have
limited management’s efforts to correct disaster recovery problems
We determined insufficient
resources was one of the causes for recurring disaster recovery problems. The IRS Information Systems (IS) and Business Systems
Modernization (BSM) budgets have decreased over the last several years. In FY 2003, the IS and BSM budgets provided
7,466 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) and $1.971 billion. However, the President’s FY 2005 IS and BSM
budget requests would provide 7,385 FTEs (1.1 percent reduction) and $1.958
billion (0.7 percent reduction, including a 24.4 percent reduction in the BSM
budget).
Since October 2001, MITS
organization management has worked to provide resources to improve disaster
recovery capabilities, with limited results.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, IRS management considered
MITS organization requests for $87.6 million for disaster recovery
improvements, and the Congress approved $13.5 million for the Master File
disaster recovery capability. In the
review and approval process, requests for $74.1 million were turned down,
including:
·
Designing and defining the architecture for the Competency-Based
Organization (CBO) and enterprise command centers. MITS organization management cited these two
areas as corrective action for a Master File Disaster Recovery TIGTA audit
recommendation (see Appendix IV, Audit Report number 6) and is using operations
funds to implement the CBO.
For FY 2005, Enterprise Operations office management requested $16.7 million for
ECC mainframe computer improvements (e.g., Unisys mainframe computer upgrades,
Virtual Tape System development) that would ensure disaster recovery
capabilities. Management categorized the
upgrades and improvements as unfunded critical needs, but MITS organization
budget cuts have prevented management from reallocating funds to these
items. Without the mainframe computer
upgrades and improvements, management estimated that, by FY 2006, the ECC could
not recover the systems that operate on the Unisys mainframe computers if a
disaster occurs.
In addition, the Modernization
Disaster Recovery Project has not developed and implemented a midrange computer
system disaster recovery infrastructure although the Modernized e-File (MeF)
system is in production and additional midrange computer systems, such as the
Integrated Financial System and Custodial Accounting Project, are scheduled to
enter production in FY 2005. The
Modernization Disaster Recovery Project did not implement the MeF system
disaster recovery capability in FY 2004 because only $3.3 million of the $9.9
million in the budget was provided to develop the architecture. The funds provided did not cover the
Project’s priorities. As a result, work
stopped on the midrange computer disaster recovery infrastructure. As of September 2004, the remaining funds had
not been provided and the infrastructure will be delayed.
Finally, MITS organization management advised
us personnel trained and responsible for disaster recovery support duties
(e.g., preparing and maintaining plans, test schedules, etc.) were reassigned
to the MA organization in the October 2003 MA organization realignment. However, the MITS organization continues to
be responsible for completing the disaster recovery duties. MITS organization management also advised us
senior MITS and MA organization managers are working on this issue but, as of
August 2004, had not resolved how best to transfer the personnel resources or
work.
Insufficient management oversight has hampered the identification and resolution of program weaknesses
We determined insufficient management oversight was also a cause for recurring disaster recovery problems. MA organization management advised us the FISMA requirements are the focus of their security program oversight efforts. Draft FISMA procedures (issued in August 2004) state TIGTA audit findings will be listed as system weaknesses on the FISMA Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&M). The guidelines suggest management analyze system weaknesses to identify systemic problems and elevate them to the POA&M program weakness level. The POA&M status for each system and program weakness is reported quarterly to the OMB. However, the TIGTA’s FY 2004 FISMA report to the Department of the Treasury stated the IRS POA&Ms do not contain details sufficient to permit oversight and tracking of security weaknesses. As a result, the current POA&M system weaknesses do not individually identify the TIGTA audit findings and, therefore, could not be analyzed for systemic problems (i.e., recurring issues that might indicate a systemic problem) that should be elevated to the program weakness level. The IRS continues to have significant disaster recovery program issues because it has not effectively implemented management controls, such as FISMA POA&M procedures.
The IRS Commissioner’s service and enforcement priorities
are heavily dependent on the information systems that support the critical
business processes. However,
insufficient resources to implement and operate disaster recovery capabilities,
and insufficient management oversight to ensure disaster recovery policies and
standards are followed, increase
the risk the critical systems supporting the Commissioner’s service and
enforcement priorities cannot be timely recovered if a disaster occurs.
To ensure the Commissioner’s service and enforcement
priorities can be met, the CIO should:
1. Report a disaster recovery program material weakness to the Department of the Treasury as part of the IRS’ FMFIA annual evaluation of controls and include the following activities (new and currently underway) in the corrective action plan:
Management’s Response: IRS management will declare the disaster recovery program a material weakness. IRS management responded the IRS could recover all vital data for the most mission critical information technology systems, including the Master File and the Customer Account Data Engine (CADE). They are committed to increasing their disaster recovery capabilities based on available funding and an evaluation of cost and risk factors.
The MA organization is responsible for coordinating the development of an IRS-wide business resumption strategy. The MITS organization has identified its current disaster recovery and business resumption strategies, including both data recovery point and recovery time objectives, for all major systems. A listing of the crucial business processes required to continue fulfilling IRS tax administration responsibilities has been identified and prioritized. Further analysis of this prioritization will include mapping the critical business processes to the specific computing system major applications and general supporting systems that directly support those IRS critical business processes, along with conducting a gap analysis to identify inadequate disaster recovery capabilities. In addition, IRS management will coordinate with the Department of the Treasury and the OMB to request the funding needed to support the business resumption and disaster recovery requirements.
2.
Work
with the Chief, MA, to implement FISMA POA&M procedures to analyze system
weaknesses for systemic problems and elevate them as program-level weaknesses.
Management’s Response: IRS senior leadership established an executive working group to identify roles and responsibilities and to provide the leadership and guidance needed to implement FISMA POA&M procedures.
Appendix I
The objective of this review was to provide an overall assessment of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) disaster recovery program. To accomplish this objective, we:
I. Reviewed guidance documents and interviewed Modernization and Information Technology Services (MITS) and Mission Assurance (MA) organization management officials to determine whether policies and procedures clearly defined the responsibilities for ensuring the disaster recovery program is effective.
A. Reviewed Office of Management and Budget, Department of the Treasury, and IRS policies and procedures documents and prior Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) audits to document IRS management’s disaster recovery program management and oversight roles and responsibilities.
B. Interviewed MITS and MA organization managers about their disaster recovery oversight roles and responsibilities and determined whether the roles and responsibilities were clearly defined and effectively performed.
II. Reviewed 11 previously issued TIGTA audit reports on the IRS’ disaster recovery program activities after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the status of management’s corrective actions to identify trends in the findings and recommendations.
A.
Reviewed 11 TIGTA audit reports and the Joint Audit
Management Enterprise System Corrective Action Form status reports for 44 recommendations as of September 4, 2004,
to identify trends.
1.
For the audits listed in Appendix IV, prepared a schedule
containing the findings, recommendations, management responses and original due
dates, and status of the corrective actions, including revised due dates and
status descriptions.
2.
Evaluated the schedule prepared in Step II.A.1. to identify
trends.
B.
Reviewed the trends
identified in Step II.A.2. to determine whether corrective actions implemented
on earlier recommendations were not effective and had an impact on later
findings.
III. Determined the higher-level cause(s) for identified trends.
A. Interviewed MITS and MA organization managers to obtain their explanations for the trends and determined whether other factors resulted in the corrective actions not being effective or implemented.
B. Reviewed documentation supporting the managers’ explanations of other factors that resulted in the corrective actions not being effective or implemented and determined the causes of these factors.
Appendix II
Major Contributors to This
Report
Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit
(Information Systems Programs)
Gary Hinkle, Director
Danny Verneuille, Audit Manager
Michael Garcia, Senior Auditor
Kim McManis, Auditor
Appendix III
Commissioner
C
Office of the Commissioner – Attn: Chief of Staff C
Deputy Commissioner for
Operations Support OS
Associate Chief Information
Officer, Information Technology Services
OS:CIO:I
Acting Director, Assurance Programs OS:MA:AP
Director, Operational Assurance OS:MA:O
Director,
Stakeholder Management OS:CIO:SM
Director, Enterprise Operations OS:CIO:I:EO
Director, Detroit Computing Center OS:CIO:I:EO:DC
Director,
Enterprise Computing Center OS:CIO:I:EO:MC
Chief
Counsel CC
National Taxpayer Advocate TA
Director, Office of Legislative
Affairs CL:LA
Director, Office of
Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis
RAS:O
Office
of Management Controls OS:CFO:AR:M
Audit Liaisons:
Chief, Mission Assurance OS:MA
Associate Chief Information
Officer, Information Technology Services OS:CIO:I
Director, Enterprise Operations OS:CIO:I:EO
Manager, Program
Oversight Office OS:CIO:SM:
Appendix IV
Previously Issued Audit Reports Reviewed
The 11
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Audit Reports reviewed for
the overall assessment of the disaster recovery program are:
|
1. |
The Internal Revenue Service Has Made Substantial
Progress in Its Business Continuity Program, but Continued Efforts Are Needed
(Reference
Number 2003-20-026, dated December 2002). |
|
2. |
Progress Has
Been Made in Protecting Critical Assets (Reference Number 2003-20-047, dated February 2003). |
|
3. |
Improvements
Are Needed to Effectively Implement the Disaster Recovery Strategy for
Consolidated Mid-Range Computer Systems (Reference Number 2003-20-084, dated |
|
4. |
The Implementation of Software Products to Manage and Control Computer
Resources Needs Improvement (Reference Number 2003-20-151, dated July 2003). |
|
5. |
Risks Are
Mounting as the Integrated Financial System Project Team Strives to Meet an
Aggressive Implementation Date (Reference Number 2004-20-001, dated October 2003). |
|
6. |
The
Master File Disaster Recovery Exercise Was Completed, but Significant
Vulnerabilities Should Be Addressed (Reference Number 2004-20-053, dated March 2004). |
|
7. |
The Custodial
Accounting Project Team Is Making Progress; However, Further Actions Should
Be Taken to Increase the Likelihood of a Successful Implementation (Reference Number 2004-20-061, dated March
2004). |
|
8. |
Additional
Disaster Recovery Planning, Testing, and Training Are Needed for Data
Communications (Reference
Number 2004-20-079, dated April 2004). |
|
9. |
Mainframe
Computer Disaster Recovery Risks Are Increased Due to Insufficient Computer
Capacity and Testing (Reference Number 2004-20-142, dated August 2004). |
|
10. |
The Integrated
Financial System Project Team Needs to Resolve Transition Planning and
Testing Issues to Increase the Chances of a Successful Deployment (Reference |
|
11. |
To Ensure the
Customer Account Data Engine’s Success, Prescribed Management Practices Need
to Be Followed (Reference Number 2005-20-005, dated November 2004). |
Appendix V
The response was
removed due to its size. To see the
response, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public
Web Page.