TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX
ADMINISTRATION
While Renowned
for Its Forensics Capabilities, the Digital Evidence Program Faces Challenges
and Needs More Controls
Issued on April 30, 2008
Highlights
Highlights of
Report Number: 2008-10-106 to the
Internal Revenue Service Chief, Criminal Investigation.
IMPACT ON TAXPAYERS
While the Criminal Investigation (CI) Division Electronic Crimes Program
(E-Crimes) enjoys an excellent reputation throughout the law enforcement community
for digital evidence forensics, the absence of some Program-level processing
controls has created risks that could compromise investigations in worst-case
scenarios. As the volume of digital
evidence significantly increases, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must
ensure that it treats this evidence properly and consistently
to secure its continued admissibility in court.
WHY TIGTA DID THE AUDIT
This audit is
related to the Major Management Challenges of tax compliance initiatives and
taxpayer protection and rights. The
overall objective of this review was to determine whether E-Crimes properly controlled the collection and
timely analysis of digital evidence in support of IRS special agents.
WHAT
TIGTA FOUND
E-Crimes has not established some common and necessary
internal controls over digital evidence seized during investigations. For example, digital evidence is not backed up
offsite, computer investigative specialist (CIS) agents are not required to
keep a detailed record of their activities relating to an investigation, and
digital or physical evidence in the possession of CIS agents is not
periodically validated.
While our audit objective did not include a detailed
assessment of the IRS’ forward-looking strategies to maintain and advance the
E-Crimes digital evidence program, TIGTA identified issues that could become
problematic without management’s attention, as demand for E‑Crimes’
services increases.
WHAT TIGTA
RECOMMENDED
TIGTA
recommended that the
Director, Electronic Crimes, protect digital evidence by 1) implementing a
near-term disaster avoidance plan for digital data, 2) developing effective
quality control guidelines and documentation standards for the forensic
process, and 3) clarifying the role of the management information system as an evidence
inventory control subject to periodic validation. In addition, TIGTA recommended that the
Chief, Criminal Investigation, assess challenges to maintaining and advancing
the digital evidence program by 1) testing the option of using non-law
enforcement positions to benefit the field office role, 2) assigning
responsibility to a task force or project management team regarding development
of and contingency management for non-technological aspects of technology
modernization, and 3) continuing to assess the span of control for first-line
supervisors as the recently approved direct-line authority is implemented and
experienced.
In their response to the report, IRS officials agreed with five of our six
recommendations and partially agreed with one recommendation. The CI Division plans to, 1) establish policy
directives to require periodic validation of evidence data, 2) review its standard
operating procedures annually and develop documentation standards to include in
future policy directives, 3) monitor, re-evaluate, and adjust the span of
control for the newly created direct-line supervisory positions as needed, and 4)
ensure that project management teams for the information technology
infrastructure project remain in compliance with the risk management process.
In two instances, TIGTA does
not believe that the CI Division’s corrective actions address the concerns in
our recommendations. The CI Division
believes that the information technology infrastructure project is near-term
enough to facilitate the disaster avoidance plan we recommended. Funding for this project was scheduled for
Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010, but funding for technology initiatives is dependent
on the budget and might be at risk of not being fully approved. In addition, the CI Division continues to
believe that its current model of having experienced agents as CIS agents is
most prudent for field offices. However,
if the option of blending non-law enforcement personnel with experienced agents in
the field is not piloted, CI Division management will be missing a valuable opportunity
to maximize resources and minimize the risk of continued conversion of
experienced special agents to CIS agents, thus exacerbating staff attrition
concerns.
READ THE
FULL REPORT
To view the report,
including the scope, methodology, and full IRS response, go to:
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200810106fr.html.
Email Address: inquiries@tigta.treas.gov
Phone Number: 202-622-6500
Web Site:
http://www.tigta.gov