Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration
Office of Audit
COMPUTER SYSTEM ACCESS CONTROLS OVER
CONTRACTORS NEED TO BE IMPROVED
Issued on July 24, 2009
Highlights
Highlights of
Report Number: 2009-20-108 to the Internal
Revenue Service Chief Technology Officer.
IMPACT ON TAXPAYERS
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
uses contractors to perform a variety of information technology functions, such
as developing applications for IRS business operations and maintaining computer
operations. To perform these functions,
contractors are granted access to IRS computer systems. However, some contractors who no longer had a
business need to have access had active user accounts on IRS systems. When contractors are allowed to have unnecessary
access to computer systems, the IRS is increasing the risks of exposing
taxpayer data to unauthorized disclosure and disruption of system operations.
WHY TIGTA DID THE AUDIT
This review was included in the TIGTA Fiscal Year 2008 Annual
Audit Plan as part of the statutory requirements to annually review the
adequacy and security of IRS information technology.
WHAT
TIGTA FOUND
Despite the IRS’ policies and procedures and our previous
reports of inadequate oversight of contractor access to IRS computer systems, TIGTA
identified system access control issues for contractors. From a sample of 7 IRS systems, TIGTA
determined that 53 of 376 contractors had active user accounts but did not have
a business need for access to that system.
These 53 contractors consisted of contractors whose job duties or access
privileges had changed and no longer needed system access, contractors who had
separated from the contract with the IRS, and contractors who had never logged
onto the system or had not logged onto the system within 45 calendar days. TIGTA also identified 15 contractors whose
system access was not deleted in a timely manner upon separation from the
contract with the IRS. These
contractors’ accesses were not removed from systems in a timely manner because
responsible officials were not following security procedures and relied on
systemic solutions to disable and delete user access to systems based on
inactivity.
WHAT TIGTA RECOMMENDED
TIGTA
recommended that the
Chief Technology Officer 1) provide appropriate communications to all
Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives and
managers reinforcing the need to ensure that system
accesses are revoked when contractors leave the IRS and that separation
of duties is followed, 2) enforce current procedures on all systems by
configuring systems to automatically disable and/or delete user accounts when
they are not accessed for the appropriate number of days, 3) provide
appropriate communications to all Contracting Officer’s Technical
Representatives and managers to remind them that they
have the primary responsibility for providing prompt notification to the
responsible organization of any contractor status changes, 4) provide
appropriate communications to Contracting Officer’s Technical
Representatives and managers that the Online 5081
system is the primary system used for authorizing and approving requests for
any system access and that system access should not be granted until a
contractor or employee has successfully completed a background investigation, and 5) improve accountability over employee and manager
adherence with security policies and procedures over contractor system access.
In their response to the
report, IRS officials agreed with the recommendations. The Modernization and Information Technology
Services Cybersecurity organization plans to coordinate with the Agency-Wide
Shared Services Contractor Oversight Group to develop and deliver appropriate
communications content to Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives and
managers to address the report recommendations.
Also, the Modernization and Information Technology Services organization
plans to enforce system configuration settings to automatically disable
contractor’s accounts after 45 calendar days of inactivity and ensure that accounts
that are inactive for more than 90 days are deleted or securely incapacitated.
READ THE
FULL REPORT
To view the report,
including the scope, methodology, and full IRS response, go to:
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200920108fr.html.
Email Address: inquiries@tigta.treas.gov
Phone Number: 202-622-6500
Web Site:
http://www.tigta.gov