U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

FACT SHEET: SANCTIONS ON IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND AFFILIATES

Action Targets the Iranian Regime’s Continued Human Rights Abuses, WMD Proliferation, and Support for Terrorism

E.O. 13628 Designations Targeting the Iranian Regime’s Abuse of Human Rights

The following individuals and entities have either engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to Iran on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran; or that limit access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam or restrict an international signal, or provided technological support for the foregoing or are otherwise owned or controlled by such individuals or entities that are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13628.

Ali Fazli

Ali Fazli is the Deputy Commander of the Basij militia, which has launched attacks against websites, including those of foreign news outlets, in an effort to suppress the Iranian people’s access to information. Basij members have also violently attacked peaceful demonstrators and prohibited the exercise of freedom of assembly in Iran. In his prior position as the head of the Seyyed ol-Shohada Corps of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Fazli played a role in the brutal repression of civilian protesters in 2009, after the reelection of President Ahmadinejad and during the Student Day protests. The Basij militia was previously designated in June 2011 for serious human rights abuses under E.O. 13553.

Name: Ali Fazli
DOB: April 20, 1961
Alt. DOB: 1951
POB: Sarkan, Hamedan Province, Iran
Rank: Brigadier General
Title: Basij Deputy Commander
Reza Taghipour

Reza Taghipour is the Minister of Communications and Information Technology and one of the leading Iranian officials in charge of censorship, control of internet activities, and control of other types of communications. Reza Taghipour has been responsible for the blocking of mobile lines and text messaging, jamming of satellite television channels, and local suspension of internet connectivity in the wake of the June 2009 elections.

Name: Reza Taghipour
AKA: Reza Taghipour Anvari
DOB: 1957
POB: Maragheh, Iran
Title: Minister of Communications and Information Technology

Esma’il Ahmadi Moghaddam

Esma’il Ahmadi Moghaddam has been the head of the Iranian Police since 2005, and has been responsible for monitoring and tracking internet activities in Iran. Following the June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran, police forces under the command of Moghaddam directly took part in beating and arresting civilian protesters. In September 2009, Moghaddam announced the creation of the Iranian Cyber Police, which has been responsible for blocking foreign websites and social networks in Iran. Iran’s Cyber Police have played a significant role in suppressing students, political dissidents, and journalists through the monitoring of websites and social networks. Moghaddam was previously designated in June 2011, pursuant to E.O. 13572, for supporting human rights abuses being carried out by the Syrian Government and, pursuant to E.O. 13553 for the commission of serious human rights abuses in Iran.

Name: Esma’il Ahmadi Moghaddam
AKA: Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam
AKA: Ismail Ahmadi-Moghadam
AKA: Esma’il Ahmadi-Moqaddam
DOB: 1961
POB: Tehran, Iran
Rank: Brigadier General
Title: Police Chief, Commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Force

Center to Investigate Organized Crime (CIOC)

The CIOC was established by Iran’s IRGC for the purposes of protecting the Government of Iran in the cyber realm. During the June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran, the CIOC helped the Iranian Government censor websites and identify opposition activists. For example, CIOC issued a communiqué on June 17, 2009, urging website managers to block “content that incites the population to riot and spread threats and rumors.” CIOC also helped identify internet users who published material insulting government officials and questioning the elections; some of these individuals were subsequently arrested by government agencies.
Name: Center to Investigate Organized Crime
AKA: Cyber Crime Office
AKA: Center for Inspecting Organised Crimes
AKA: Center for the Study of Organized Crime
Website: gerdab.ir
Address: Tehran, Iran

Press Supervisory Board

The Press Supervisory Board was established in 1986 under the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance for the purpose of issuing licenses to publications, inspecting and supervising newspapers’ and news agencies’ performances, and overseeing subsidies to the press, all according to the Iranian Press Laws passed in 1986. Since the June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran, the Press Supervisory Board has regularly revoked publications’ licenses to publish, particularly those publications that publish articles, opinions, or cartoons that question or criticize the Government of Iran.

Name: Press Supervisory Board
AKA: Iranian Press Supervisory Board
Location: Tehran, Iran

Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance

The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which heads the Press Supervisory Board, has implemented punitive measures against newspapers and news agencies that do not adhere to its publication guidelines issued in 2008. These measures include banning newspapers, either directly or indirectly through the Press Supervisory Board, and arresting and detaining more than 150 journalists since the June 12, 2009 presidential election in Iran.

Name: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance
Address: Bahretn Square, Avenue Kamalolmolk, Tehran, Iran
Website: www.farhang.gov.ir/home-en.html

Rasool Jalili

As of February 2009, Rasool Jalili was attempting to acquire equipment related to monitoring of SMS traffic from abroad and as of early July 2012, Rasool Jalili was actively assisting the Government of Iran's internet censorship activities and was involved in blocking Iranian citizens’ internet access to Facebook, ebay, and YouTube, in addition to other sites. Rasool Jalili also assisted in blocking any website that contained content criticizing the Iranian Government such as independent and international newspapers, blogs, and activist sites. In addition, Rasool Jalili's company, AmnAfzar, provided internet censorship and filtering software to the Government of Iran.

On March 7, 2012, Rasool Jalili was appointed by the Supreme Leader of Iran as a member of Iran’s Supreme Council of Virtual Space (AKA Supreme Council of Cyberspace). The Council is charged with establishing a center of national cyberspace to define policy and coordinate and make decisions regarding cyberspace.
Name: Rasool Jalili
DOB: August 19, 1961
POB: Eghlid, Fars Province, Iran
Address: 90 Park Ave, Farahzadi St, Tehran, Iran
Title: Associate Professor, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology
Title: Dean of Scientific and International Cooperation, Sharif University of Technology
Title: Head of Information Technology Group, Sharif University of Technology

AmnAfzar Gostar-e Sharif

AmnAfzar, a company owned or controlled by Rasool Jalili, has provided technological support, or goods or services to or in support of, the activities described in subsection (a)(i) of section 5 of E.O. 13628. Rasool Jalili, the founder of AmnAfzar, remains the company's largest shareholder and the head of its steering committee. Rasool Jalili's relationship with government and military officials is one of AmnAfzar's key competitive advantages. Many ISPs in Iran use an integrated software and hardware system known as Separ, produced by AmnAfzar, which can monitor web traffic and block political websites and internet communications. AmnAfzar also produces, among other things, filtering and monitoring hardware and software, including Separ Web Filter, Saran Web Filter, Squid Escort Web Filter, and Alal Web Filter. The filters remove “illegal” web content as defined by Iranian cyber policy criteria. For instance, Separ Web Filter is a URL filtering device that removes “illegal” internet content and analyzes web traffic. It is capable of real-time inspection of transmitted data, deep URL inspection, and includes a filtering database that is updated regularly. It also includes real-time monitoring capabilities. AmnAfzar’s Squid Escort filtering system is an internet filtering software that can filter by address, user name, internet address type, group and origins. Another product produced by AmnAfzar, Parsgate, provides for content filtering, traffic authentication, instant messaging (IM) and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) filtering, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) monitoring and filtering, and other services. AmnAfzar also provided an email and attachment monitoring system for use by the Iranian Government.

Name: AmnAfzar Gostar-e Sharif
AKA: AmnAfzar, AKA Sharif SecureWare
Address: 5th Floor, No. 35, Qasemi St., North Side of Sharif University, Azadi Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Address: No. 131, Pardis Technology Park, Pardis, Iran
Address: Unit 3, 2nd Floor, No. 1176, Between 52, 54 VakilAbad Blvd, Mashhad, Iran
Address: Shahid Beheshti Ave, Sahand St.m No. 20, 3rd, Tehran, Iran 1587677518
Website: www.amnafzar.com
E-Mail: info@amnafzar.com

PeykAsa

PeykAsa, a company owned or controlled by Rasool Jalili, was founded in 2000 as a developer of telecommunication software, and was the outcome of an idea to develop an SDM center at Sharif University of Technology. PeykAsa is a leading producer of
telecommunication products in Iran and provides SMS Center services and Mobile IP services. The company’s Chairman is Rasool Jalili.

Name: PeykAsa
AKA: PeykAsa Message Ware Co
Address: No. 10, 34 Alley, Sadeghi Street, West Corner of Sharif University, Azadi Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://peykasa.com
E-mail: info@peykasa.com

E.O. 13224 Designations Targeting Terrorists and Supporters of Terrorism

Today’s E.O. 13224 designations, which targets global terrorists and their supporters, are focused on the activities and support structure of Kata’ib Hizballah (KH). KH was listed as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and pursuant to E.O. 13224 by the Department of State in June 2009 and was designated by the Department of the Treasury the same month under E.O. 13438 for engaging in acts of violence that threaten the stability of Iraq. It has been responsible for numerous violent terrorist attacks since 2007, including improvised explosive device bombings, rocket propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations. KH also targeted the International Zone in Baghdad in a November 29, 2008 rocket attack that killed two UN workers. In addition, KH has threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians that support the legitimate political process in Iraq.

Mohammad Mina'i

Mina'i is a senior IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) officer who has been involved in operations in Iraq. Mina'i has supported IRGC-QF training for KH personnel. This type of training is coordinated with Lebanese Hizballah in Iran. Mina'i has also been involved with lethal support to Iraqi militant groups and has ties to Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, who was previously designated by the U.S. Treasury Department on January 9, 2008, for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq.

Name: Mohammad Mina'i
AKA: Muhamed Miinaee
DOB: 1964
POB: Iran
Citizenship: Iranian

Karim Ja'far Muhsin al-Ghanimi

Ghanimi is the overall leader of KH, which has used facilities in Iran to send weapons to Iraq. Ghanimi has organized KH military-related training in Iran from the IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hizballah. Ghanimi has sent money provided by the IRGC-QF to KH leaders in Iraq.

Name: Karim Ja'far Muhsin al-Ghanimi
AKA: Karim Mansur al-Ghanimi
AKA: Karim Jafar Hasan al-Zirjawi
AKA: Karim Abu Islam
DOB: 1968
DOB: 1969
POB: al-Amarah, Iraq
Citizenship: Iraqi

Sayyid Salah Mandi Hantush al-Maksusi

Maksusi is a senior KH operations officer who personally oversaw and executed improvised rocket assisted mortar (IRAM) attacks against Coalition forces in Iraq. Maksusi has taken up residence at a KH facility in Tehran, Iran, and has a direct relationship with IRGC-QF official Abdul Reza Shahlai, who was previously designated by the U.S. Treasury Department on October 11, 2011, for his involvement in a plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir. Shahlai was also designated on September 16, 2008, for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq. Maksusi has received training from the IRGC-QF and from Lebanese Hizballah.

Name: Sayyid Salah Mandi Hantush al-Maksusi
AKA: Sayyid Salah
AKA: Abu Hawra
AKA: Sayyid Salah al-Musawi
DOB: 1973
DOB: 1971
Nationality: Iraq

Riyad Yunis Jasim al-Hamidawi

Hamidawi is an Iran-based KH member who has worked with other KH members on procurement issues.

Name: Riyad Yunis Jasim al-Hamidawi
AKA: Abu Tuqa
AKA: Abu Taqi
Passport Number: G1751672 (Expires February 8, 2016)
DOB: January 16, 1974
POB: Baghdad, Iraq

E.O. 13382 Designations Targeting Proliferators of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Today’s E.O. 13382 designations target the support network of the IRGC, which was designated by the U.S. Department of State, pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007, for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in proliferation related activities.

National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)

NIOC is being designated for providing, or attempting to provide, financial, material, or other support for and services in support of the IRGC. Under the current Iranian regime, the IRGC's influence has grown within NIOC and Iran’s overall energy sector. As the IRGC has become increasingly influential in Iran's energy sector, IRGC’s construction and development
wing, Khatam Al-Anbia, has obtained billions of dollars’ worth of contracts from NIOC, often without participating in a competitive bidding process.

In a separate September 2012 action, the Treasury Department also determined NIOC to be an agent or affiliate of the IRGC.

Entity: National Iranian Oil Company
AKA: NIOC
Location: National Iranian Oil Company Building, Taleghani Avenue, Hafez Street, Tehran, Iran
Website: www.nioc.ir

**Tehran Gostaresh**

Tehran Gostaresh, a general contracting company located in Iran, is being designated because it is owned or controlled by Bonyad Taavon Sepah. Bonyad Taavon Sepah holds 51 percent of Tehran Gostaresh Company’s shares. Bonyad Taavon Sepah, designated under E.O. 13382 in December 2010, was formed by IRGC commanders to structure the IRGC’s investments.

Name: Tehran Gostaresh Co. PJS
Location: No. 24, 5th Alley Khaled Eslamoli Street, Tehran 153643811, Iran

**Imam Hossein University**

Imam Hossein University (IHU) is being designated because it is owned or controlled by the IRGC and for providing, or attempting to provide technological, or other support for and services in support of the IRGC. IHU was established by IRGC Commander Mohsen Reza’i in 1986. Mohsen Reza’i served as the commander of the IRGC between 1981-1997.

Name: Imam Hussein University
AKA: IHU
AKA: Imam Hossein University
AKA: Imaam Hossein University
AKA: Imam Hoseyn University
AKA: Imam Hossein University Complex
AKA: Emam Hoseyn Comprehensive University
AKA: University of Imam Hoseyn
Location: Near Fourth Square, Tehran Pars, Shahid Babaie Highway, near Hakimiyeh and Mini-City, Tehran, Iran
Location: Kilometer 11, Shahid Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran
Website: www.ihu.ac.ir/

**Baghyatollah Medical Sciences University**

Baghyatollah Medical Sciences University (BMSU) is being designated because it is owned or controlled by the IRGC and for providing, or attempting to provide, technological or other support for and services in support of the IRGC. BMSU was founded in 1994 as the primary medical institution for IRGC. The head of BMSU is an IRGC Brigadier General, Jafar
Aslani, who works with other IRGC affiliated units and research facilities, such as Imam Hossein University, and IRGC ground forces.

Name: Baghyatollah Medical Sciences University
AKA: Bagiatollah Medical Sciences University
AKA: Baghiatollah Medical Sciences University
AKA: Baqyatollah Medical Sciences University
AKA: Baqiyatallah Medical Sciences University
AKA: Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences
AKA: Baqiatollah Medical Sciences University
Location: Vanak Square, Molla-Sadra Avenue, Box number: 19945, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.bmsu.ac.ir/

Amendments to the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 561

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is amending the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 561 (the “IFSR”), to incorporate changes made by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. These changes strengthen the sanctions imposed against the Iranian Government by expanding the categories of activities for which foreign financial institutions could be subjected to sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”). For example, the amendments to subsection (2)(E)(ii) of section 104(c) of CISADA now allow the imposition of sanctions on a foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates significant transactions or provides significant financial services for a “person” whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to either E.O. 13882 or 13224 in connection with Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) or delivery systems for WMD or support for international terrorism; whereas, formerly, the sanctions under this subsection could be imposed only for facilitating significant transactions or providing significant financial services for an Iranian-linked “financial institution” blocked under those orders.

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