New Measures Further Constrain
Iranian Oil Revenues and Target Those Responsible for Iran’s Human Rights
Abuses
WASHINGTON – The
United States is taking a number of actions today that tighten sanctions on
Iran’s access to its oil revenues and further expose the Iranian government’s
continued abuse of human rights. Key
provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(TRA) that go into effect today, expand the scope of sanctionable transactions
with the Central Bank of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions by
restricting Iran’s ability to use oil revenue held in foreign financial
institutions as well as preventing repatriation of those funds to Iran. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, in
consultation with the U.S. Department of State, also designated one individual and
four entities for their involvement in the Iranian government’s censorship
activities. These censorship activities
restrict the free flow of information in Iran and punish Iranian citizens who
are attempting to exercise freedom of assembly and expression.
“Our policy is clear – so long as Iran continues to fail to
address the concerns of the international community about its nuclear program,
the U.S. will impose tighter sanctions and intensify the economic pressure
against the Iranian regime,” said Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.
“We will also target those in Iran who are responsible for human right
abuses, especially those who deny the Iranian people their basic freedoms of
expression, assembly and speech.”
Today marks 180 days since the President signed the
TRA. Section 504 of the TRA amends
existing sanctions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (NDAA) that target the Central Bank of Iran, designated Iranian financial
institutions and Iran’s energy sector.
At the 180-day mark, section 504 narrows the exception for countries
that have significantly reduced their purchases of Iranian crude oil so that
the exception now only applies to financial transactions that facilitate bilateral
trade between the country granted the exception and Iran. For the exception to apply to a financial
transaction, funds owed to Iran as a result of such bilateral trade will now
have to be credited to an account located in the country granted the exception
and may not be repatriated to Iran.
This provision will significantly increase economic pressure
on Iran by restricting Iran’s repatriation of oil revenue. In addition to effectively “locking up”
Iranian oil revenue overseas, this provision sharply restricts Iran’s use of
this revenue for bilateral trade and severely limits Iran’s ability to move
funds across jurisdictions.
Humanitarian
Exceptions
The increased restrictions, however, do not apply to the sale
of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
is issuing guidance
today to make it clear that such humanitarian trade with Iran is neither
subject to these sanctions nor to sanctions previously imposed on Iran.
Sanctions Linked to
Censorship in Iran
In addition to increasing economic pressure on Iran, the Treasury
Department, in consultation with the State Department, designated the Islamic
Republic of Iran Broadcasting and its director, as well as three other entities
in Iran, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13628, which implements the TRA by
giving the Treasury Department the authority to designate those in Iran who
restrict or deny the free flow of information to or from the Iranian
people.
Any property or interests in property in the United States
or in the possession or control of U.S. persons in which the designated
entities or individuals have an interest are blocked, and U.S. persons are
generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.
Islamic Republic of
Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and Ezzatollah Zarghami
IRIB was established as the main governmental agency in
charge of the broadcasting policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and is
responsible for producing numerous national and international television and
radio channels. Ezzatollah Zarghami is
the director and head of IRIB. He was
appointed as the Director in May 2004, and reappointed in November 2009. Since his reappointment, Zarghami has pursued
a policy of modernization in form but restriction in content.
According to human rights groups, Iran is using state-media
transmissions to trample dissent. They
point to distorted or false IRIB news reports and the broadcasting of forced
confessions of political detainees, such as one involving Newsweek journalist
Maziar Bahari, who was forced to give a false confession in front of state
media outlets while jailed in 2009. In
March 2012, the European Union placed individual sanctions on Zarghami for
authorizing, as head of IRIB, the broadcast in August 2009 and December 2011 of
forced confessions of detainees and “show trials” that constituted a clear
violation of international provisions on fair trial and the right to due
process. Additionally, Iran is engaged
in a campaign to filter out unwanted TV content and broadcast its own
propaganda.
After the 2009 presidential election in Iran, jamming of
foreign channels, particularly the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and
Voice of America (VOA), increased in intensity.
Then, in the wake of the Arab Spring movements, Iran increased its
jamming of the BBC, VOA, and other Western networks with Persian-language news
channels. The move was intended to
prevent Iranian audiences from seeing foreign broadcasts that the Iranian
government found objectionable. Zarghami
has admitted using such tactics, according to Iranian state media reports.
Iranian Cyber Police
The Iranian Cyber Police was formed in 2009, and has worked
with other Iranian cyber units to filter websites, monitor Internet behavior,
and hack email accounts related to political action on the Internet. The Iranian Cyber Police has made
arrangements to increase filtering on Facebook and block content on social
networking websites that the Iranian government finds objectionable. On December 22, 2011, the Law Enforcement
Forces of Iran publically announced that the Iranian Cyber Police was
monitoring all suspicious Internet activity, emails, and text messages. The Iranian Cyber Police published a detailed
list of rules and regulations corresponding to its increased monitoring and
scrutiny of the Internet. In 2012, the
Iranian Cyber Police ordered the deletion of Iranian blogs and brought charges
against some people connected with the blogs.
On October 30, 2012, the Iranian Cyber Police arrested blogger Sattar
Beheshti, reportedly for anti-government comments he posted online. Beheshti, who was kept in detention without a
warrant, died in custody in early November, allegedly during interrogation.
Communications
Regulatory Authority (CRA)
The CRA enforces Iranian government requirements to filter
Internet content. The CRA has
implemented Iranian government-mandated lawful intercept requirements for
Iranian telecommunications companies.
Following post-election unrest on June 13, 2009, the CRA ordered
hundreds of websites blocked for nearly a week.
Additionally, in early June 2009, the CRA ordered the blockage of
hundreds of public Internet websites in anticipation of the June 12
presidential election in Iran. This
large-scale effort was focused on blocking access to English and Farsi versions
of foreign news agencies, social networking sites, blogs, and other such public
forums.
Iran Electronics
Industries (IEI)
IEI was
previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in September 2008, for its
connections to Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and Iran's
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). According to its website, IEI is a major
producer of electronic systems and products in Iran. IEI offers a number of goods and services
related to jamming, monitoring, and eavesdropping.
Satellite
jamming is a pervasive reality in Iran. It is used to censor free speech and prohibit
access to information through deliberate interference for the express purpose of
preventing access to specific content. Orbital and terrestrial jamming is frequently
used in Iran to prevent access to specific news and information broadcast from
abroad. Jamming devices are radio
frequency transmitters that intentionally block, jam, or interfere with
communications such as cell phone calls, text messages, GPS systems, and Wi-Fi
networks.
As of 2011,
the Iranian government has been able to monitor text-messaging services via a
monitoring system installed by IEI.
In the context
of their use by the Government of Iran, monitoring and eavesdropping form an
integral part of the Iranian regime’s effort to control and limit content and
suppress speech. Iran is investing in
improving its technical capacity to extensively monitor the behavior of its
citizens on the Internet. The Iranian
authorities routinely use surveillance to round up and interrogate political
activists. The government’s use of
sophisticated monitoring technology, including that which targets text
messages, has helped the Iranian authorities crush activism in Iran.
Identifying
information
Name: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
AKA: IRIB
AKA: Islamic Republic
of Iran BroadCasting Org.
AKA: National Iranian
Radio and Television
Registration #: 1792
Website: http://www.irib.ir
Alt. Website: http://iransat.irib.ir
Address: Jamejam
Street, Valiasr Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Address:
Satellite Department, IRIB, Jame Jam St., Tehran, Iran
Alt. Address:
Department of IT-IRIB, P.O. Box 19395-333, Jaame Jam. St, Valiasr Ave,
Tehran, Iran
Alt. Address: IT
Department, Fanni Building No 3, Jame jam, Valiasr St., Tehran, IR
Alt. Address: 200
Mosaddegh Avenue, Jaame Jam Street, Vali Asr Ave, P.O. Box 1333, Tehran
193933333, Iran
Alt. Address: Fatemi
Building P.O. Box 15875 / 4333 Tehran
Name: Ezzatollah
Zarghami
Title: Director, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
POB: Dezful, Khuzentan Province, Iran
DOB: Circa 1959
Name: Iranian Cyber Police
AKA: FATA Police
Webpage: http://www.cyberpolice.ir
Name: Iranian
Communications Regulatory Authority
AKA: Sazman-E Tanzim
Moghararat
Address: Ministry of
Information and Communications Technology, P.O. Box 15598-4415, 1631713761,
Tehran, Iran
Webpage: http://www.cra.ir
Name: Iran Electronics Industries
AKA: IEI
AKA: SAIRAN
AKA: Sanaye
Electronic Iran
AKA: Sanad Iran
Electronics Industries
AKA: Sherkat Sanayeh
Electronics Iran
Address: P.O. Box
19575-365, Shahied Langari Street, Noboniad Sq, Pasdaran Ave, Saltanad Abad,
Tehran, Iran;
Alt. Address: P.O.
Box 71365-1174, Hossain Abad/Ardakan Road, Shiraz, Iran
Alt. Address: Hossein
Abad/Ardakan Road, P.O. Box 555, Shiraz 71365/1174, Iran
Alt. Address: Shahid
Langari Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.ieimil.ir
Alt. Website: http://www.ieicorp.com
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